Is There Something Broken in the FAA?
This article has been written as an outsider looking in, it is a personal opinion. What prompted a trawl through the internet at an area that I am not working in? It was yet another Twitter posting of a 6 figure fine being imposed on an airline in the States for a maintenance violation. It appears to be an increasing trend. I decided to look into it, as I am someone that travels extensively, I have an interest in aircraft or airlines that I might have to fly with!
A quick Google search for “FAA Maintenance Violations” reveals almost $17M in fines, on page 1 alone, that have been awarded against a diverse group including Southwest Airlines, US Airways, United Airlines and extending down as far a piston twins and singles used in flight training schools. Those being exposed are amongst the biggest players in the industry today, standard bearers for the rest of the world with regard to LCCs in Southwest’s case. So what has been missed by the operators or maintenance facilities:
- Continental were fined for operating an aircraft for problems with the undercarriage, in-fact an aircraft flew 12 revenue earning sectors, after a diversion for high rates of fuel burn before it was fully addressed.
- Atlas operated a B747 with an incorrectly fitted first officer’s window, aircraft suffered multiple pressurisation issues.
- US Airways and United Airlines operating their aircraft with outstanding ADs or routine maintenance checks.
- A flight school aircraft were found to have incomplete repairs on their aircraft.
The above list is just a small sample from one Google search; I did not review the 1290 related sites and stories. So how does that compare with the UK, over a 10 year period between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2006 there were 3284 Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MOR) against all aircraft above 5700Kg, I have to admit that I was responsible for a number of those for in 2001-2005. The MORs were assessed against three standards:
- Maintenance Control – Failure to schedule and accomplish a maintenance task as programmed an average of 80 per year.
- Incomplete Maintenance – Failure to complete a maintenance task, for whatever reason an average of 67 per year.
- Incorrect Maintenance – An action that has been completed but did not achieve the required results due to the actions of the engineer 174 per year.
Similar criteria to the failings noted above, data from CAA Paper 2009/05.
The analysis needs to go further to take the effect of national fleet size and number of sectors per year. Examples given show repeated failures of maintenance control, tens of flights, in one case a particular A320 flew 855 sectors without maintenance in accordance with the approved airline programme; that indicates a system failure not an individual failure. As I said above I was responsible for a number of MORs, all of them were for single failures on single aircraft and did not relate to the repetitive failures indicted through the FAA actions.
Why is it different under the CAA/EASA regulations against the FAA? It was suggested that as long the second A in the FAA stood for administration and not authority that is where the issue lies, I am not so sure on that. Is it that the oversight regime and requirements are different, under EASA than under the FAA? Can the airline put maintenance control as a risk and manage it that way? From our shores that is how it appears, if we get caught we will pay the fine, it is cheaper than compliance across the fleet! That might have been the case; the value of the fines is increasing.
Almost all the examples of failure in the States were from airlines with in-house engineering, in Europe there is a greater use of out-sourced service providers; in my case as a service provider, I had my QA Department, the Airline’s QA department both looking at our processes and practices, then we had the Regulatory looking at the airline exercising their obligations. There is greater pressure on you as a service provider supporting a number or airlines, to ensure that everything is correct! The airlines are less inclined to let little things go, because we all work for the same organisation! I am not saying that this is the only reason, but in my opinion it has an effect.
As always I look forward to your thoughts and comments!
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It is to be noted that the FARs are laws and not merely regulations. Having said that the basic function of the FAA, EASA or any national authority is to ensure we all follow the rules. In a way the FAA needs to work more with airlines and MROs to ensure compliance rather than inspectors working as lawyers preparing cases against their stakeholders.
Corporate pressures on Maintenance and Operations departments to meet financial targets is not only in the USA but is everywhere, forcing departments to apply more elastic interpretations of the rules. As long as each department is responsible for its quality, safety and security objectives and these are overseen by personnel reporting to executives of each department the element of checks and balances is weakened.
I am not advocating a reversion to a centralised QA department, but to a better look on how checks and balances are promoted in each department.